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Abstract
This paper outlines a distributed GDSS suitable to be used over the Internet, based on the VIP Analysis method-
ology and software. VIP Analysis incorporates complementary approaches to deal with the aggregation of multicriteria
performances by means of an additive value function under imprecise information. This proposed GDSS intends to
support a decision panel forming a democratic decision unit, whose members wish to reach a final decision in a choice
problem, based on consensus or on some majority rule. Its purpose is not to impose an aggregated model from the
individual ones. Rather, the GDSS is designed to reflect to each member the consequences of his/her inputs, confronting
them with analogous reflections of the group members inputs. We propose aggregation procedures to provide a
reflection of the groups inputs to each of its members, and an architecture for a GDSS implementing these procedures.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Group decision processes and negotiation processes constitute very complex human activities.
Improving their understanding justifies multidisciplinary studies, based on cognitive psychology, organi-
zational science, sociology, political science, etc. Furthermore, the development of computer-based support
tools for these activities is rooted not only in communication/information technologies and OR/manage-
ment science models, but also in human and organizational behavior studies.
This paper discusses how an existing standalone decision support tool – VIP Analysis (Dias and Clımaco,
2000a) – may evolve to become a distributed group decision support system (GDSS) suitable to support
decision making via the Internet. We address the extension to a group decision-making setting of the VIP
Analysis methodology, and propose a GDSS architecture for the extension of the VIP Analysis software.* Corresponding author. Tel.: +351-39-32689; fax: +351-39-24692.
E-mail addresses: ldias@inescc.pt (L.C. Dias), jclimaco@inescc.pt (J.N. Clımaco).
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function (e.g. see Keeney and Raiffa, 1976), in the context of choosing the best alternative in a set. It is
designed to accept imprecise information (in the sense of Athanassopoulos and Podinovski, 1997; Weber,
1987) on the models scaling constants when the Decision Makers (DMs) are not able to or do not wish to
provide precise values (for a general classification of uncertainty sources and approaches see Zimmermann,
2000). To deal with such cases, VIP Analysis considers the models scaling constants (which reflect the
importance of the criteria) as interdependent variables that may take several values subject to constraints.
The DMs, or the analyst (when exists), will find several complementary approaches in a single package,
rather than having to use different programs for different approaches.
Group decision making may benefit from working with imprecise information for many reasons. First, it
is easier for each DM, individually, to provide constraints or bounds on the variables than to find the ‘‘most
correct’’ value for them; from another perspective, it is easier for an analyst to elicit constraints than precise
values. Second, exploring the results that are known to hold despite the imprecision (the ‘‘robust’’ con-
clusions) provides hints to drive the groups discussion. Third, DMs avoid committing too early to precise
values, which might cause premature (and sometimes unnecessary) conflict. Rather, they may start by
agreeing on loose constraints and try to maintain that consensus atmosphere as they converge to more
precise results. Often, different input values lead to the same conclusions. The purpose of VIP Analysis is
hence to allow the DMs to gain insight on the situation and to let them progress in the decision process
without demanding from them precise values for the parameters, progressively reducing the number of
alternatives.
Although standalone VIP Analysis may be a useful tool in some group decision contexts, namely in face-
to-face full cooperative settings, we are aware of its many limitations. An important limitation is that it
lacks the capabilities present in most GDSSs, which allow DMs to perform private analyses and to
communicate electronically. Among other implications, this excludes its use when the DMs are spatially
distributed. A second important limitation is that VIP Analysis assumes that a model is given, which
implicitly aggregates the different models that the DMs may have (here, a model corresponds to a set of
acceptable combinations of parameter values).
The proposed extension of the VIP Analysis software to a multiperson use (VIP-G, for short) combines
computer-mediated communication with an adaptation (to a collaborative group environment) of the VIP
Analysis multiattribute evaluation tools, regarding the reconciliation of conflicts via a certain kind of
cognitive feedback (Bose and Paradice, 1999).
As stated by Davey and Olson (1998) ‘‘Decision making groups can range from cooperative, with
very similar goals and outlooks, to antagonistic, with diametrically opposed objectives. Even in
cooperative groups, conflict can arise during the decision process’’. Roughly speaking, in this paper we
are concerned with group decision, rather than with negotiation. However, the frontier between them is
fuzzy.
Conflict settings where the parties involved have fundamentally opposed objectives (e.g., buyer/seller)
are excluded from the scope of VIP-G, but settings where the priorities of the groups members may di-
verge, such as in resource allocation problems, are not excluded. VIP-G is designed to support a decision
panel (e.g., a board of directors, a quality circle, the jury of a competition. . .) forming a democratic decision
unit whose members wish to reach a final decision, in a choice problem, based on consensus or on some
majority rule. The reconciliation of the different points of view of the group members is essentially sup-
ported by a multiattribute additive model adequate to deal with imprecise information on some of the
parameters, together with appropriate tools helping to evaluate and/or guide the individual/group behavior,
and with adequate human/computer interface devices. The architecture and the aggregation tools of this
distributed GDSS are designed to contribute to high levels of cohesiveness and performance, as well as
equality of participation opportunities among a disperse group of actors, communicating via Internet in
synchronous or asynchronous settings, depending on the circumstances.
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some major contrasting characteristics. First, the fundamental objectives are common in group decisions,
while in negotiation they are opposed. Secondly, the set of alternatives is enumerated in group decisions
(although it can evolve during the communication/decision process), while in negotiation alternatives
(proposals) are sequentially presented by the parties and are to a great extent interactively generated,
making concessions and/or accommodating some needs of the other parties. This peculiar interdependence
among actors ‘‘rather than conflict, distinguishes negotiation from other forms of decision making’’
(Kersten and Cray, 1996). Thirdly, in group decisions constraints are discussed, sharing information in
order to foster interactive learning among the actors, profiting of their own experiences and of their
diversified cultural roots, and contributing to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity, while in negotiation
constraints are hidden (e.g., a sales target, or a purchase budget). Furthermore, in negotiation the values
and beliefs of the parties are also hidden, being frequently unconsciously adopted. Fourthly, voting is a
possibility of setting divergence in group decisions, but not in negotiations, where mediation or arbitration
may be needed to approximate the parties. Negotiation involves competition while group decisions are
mostly based in deliberative processes. Finally, leaving the group is not usually an option in group deci-
sions, while abandoning the negotiation (‘‘walking away’’) is often an option. In fact, the quality of the
decisions of a group strongly depends on the cohesion of the group.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the methodology of VIP
Analysis and its extension, and discusses how it may be used in group decision settings. Section 3 introduces
an illustrative example. In Section 4 we propose an architecture for a GDSS intended to support distributed
decision making, based on the methodology presented before. Finally, we offer some conclusions and
indicate some future research paths.2. Methodology
2.1. Basic VIP analysis concepts
We will first overview the current VIP Analysis methodology and software (Dias and Clımaco, 2000a,
describe it in more detail). The purpose of VIP Analysis is to support the evaluation of a discrete set of
alternatives, in order to choose the most preferred one, according to a multiattribute additive value
function (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). The global value of an alternative ai is a sum of its values at the n
criteria ðv1ðaiÞ; . . . ; vnðaiÞÞ, weighted by n scaling constants k ¼ ðk1; . . . ; knÞ that indirectly reflect the
importance of the criteria:V ðaj; kÞ ¼
Xn
j¼1
kjvjðajÞ; with
Xn
j¼1
kj ¼ 1 and kjP 0:One of the most difficult parts of the decision aid process is setting the values of the scaling constants, since
these parameters will reflect the DMs values and trade-offs (e.g., how much would you be willing to lose in
attribute ‘‘cost’’ to gain one unit in attribute ‘‘risk of accident’’?). Indeed, not only DMs may find it hard to
provide precise figures about their preferences, but also these preferences may change as the decision aid
process evolves. Moreover, the procedures used to elicit the values of the scaling constants (e.g., see Von
Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986) may require more time and patience than some DMs can spare. Finally, in
group decision situations the opinions and preferences of the DMs diverge frequently.
To overcome these difficulties, VIP Analysis proposes to advance in the decision process with variable
interdependent parameters. This means that instead of requiring precise values for the scaling constants, it
asks for intervals and linear constraints on these values. For instance, a DM (or a group of DMs) may be
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This kind of information is often designated as poor, imprecise, incomplete, or partial information (e.g., see
Weber, 1987; Dias and Clımaco, 2000a). The constraints usually stem from imprecise answers from the DM
(e.g. providing an interval for the trade-off rate between two criteria) or from holistic judgments about
alternatives that the DM is able to compare (e.g. a1 is preferred to a2). When VIP Analysis is used to
support a fully cooperative group of DMs meeting face to face, reaching a consensus on the constraints to
insert in the model can be difficult. However, we argue that reaching a consensus on precise values is much
more difficult.
Let T denote the set of all combinations of parameter values that satisfy all the constraints inserted. We
assume that the system of constraints would be consistent; otherwise, T would be an empty set. Once T is
defined, VIP Analysis may be used to discover robust conclusions (those that hold for every combination in
T ) and to identify which results are more affected by the imprecision in the parameter values (the results
that vary more). The results produced by VIP Analysis from a set T of acceptable combinations of values
for the importance parameters and a set A ¼ fa1; . . . ; amg of alternatives include the following:
• A range of values for each alternative ai 2 A, from minfV ðai; kÞ : k 2 Tg to maxfV ðai; kÞ : k 2 Tg. If the
highest possible value for an alternative ax is always less than the lowest possible value for an alternative
ay , then the first alternative could be discarded.
• The highest difference of value for each ordered pair of alternatives ðai; ajÞ 2 A2, i.e.,
maxfV ðai; kÞ  V ðaj; kÞ : k 2 Tg. If the maximum difference is negative or null then V ðaj; kÞP V ðai; kÞ
8k 2 T , which we denote as ajDai (aj ‘‘dominates’’ ai). If the maximum difference does not exceed a tol-
erance parameter e, then V ðaj; kÞP V ðai; kÞ  e 8k 2 T , which we denote as ajDeai (aj ‘‘quasi-dominates’’
ai with tolerance e).
• For each alternative ai 2 A, the ‘‘maximum regret’’ associated with choosing it, i.e. the maximum differ-
ence of value considering the alternatives that may have a higher value than ai given T :
RegretmaxðaiÞ ¼ maxfRegretðai; kÞ : k 2 Tg ði ¼ 1; . . . ;mÞ:
¼ maxfmaxfV ðaj; kÞ : j ¼ 1; . . . ;mg  V ðai; kÞ : k 2 Tg ði ¼ 1; . . . ;mÞ:
If RegretmaxðaiÞ6 0 then we can say that ai is ‘‘optimal’’; if RegretmaxðaiÞ6 e we can say that ai is ‘‘quasi-
optimal’’ with tolerance e.2.2. Extension of the methodology for explicit aggregation of individual views
VIP Analysis, as presented in the previous section, can be a useful tool to support a group of DMs
meeting face-to-face around a computer, sharing an imprecisely defined model, therefore agreeing on the
robust conclusions. The outputs of VIP Analysis may allow the decision process to progress, as the DMs
learn about the model and the problem, postponing the elicitation questions they find difficult to answer, or
prone to generate conflict. For instance, they may not agree on precise values for the scaling constants, but
may agree on a ranking of those constants (e.g. k1P k2P k3P k4). Or they may merely agree on a partial
ranking (e.g. k1P k2; k1P k3 and k3P k4). In any case, VIP Analysis provides results that may allow
to eliminate some alternatives or to highlight the most promising ones. Furthermore, the results can be used
to direct the elicitation of further information with the purpose of progressively reducing the imprecision
(e.g. ‘‘can alternative ax really attain such a high value?’’ ‘‘can all DMs agree that ax is worse than ay?’’).
Nevertheless, we are aware of the limitations of VIP Analysis as a standalone tool. Namely, it excludes
settings where the DMs are spatially distributed, it does not allow DMs to analyze the problem individ-
ually, and it implicitly requires an a priori aggregation of the different models that the DMs may have. We
will now address methodological extensions concerning aggregation support.
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information taken as input. In particular, it is not normative to a point where it recommends which
alternative is the best one given the inputs. In a group decision context, we intend to keep this attitude,
meaning that a GDSS based on VIP Analysis should neither propose (upon aggregating) a final ranking of
the alternatives, nor impose an aggregated model from the individual ones. Rather, the GDSS will be
designed to reflect (like a mirror) to each member the consequences of his/her inputs, confronting them with
analogous images of the group members inputs. The aggregation procedures will hence be used only to
provide a reflection of the groups inputs to each of its members, showing all the results that are compatible
with the inputs provided, but without pointing to a particular result as being the groups choice.
Let us consider a group of K DMs who are collaborating to recommend a solution to a decision
problem, each one having a set Tk of acceptable values for the parameters (k ¼ 1; . . . ;K). Individual per-
spectives may be aggregated either at the input level or at the output level. When aggregation occurs at the
input level (Fig. 1), an operator f ðÞ aggregates the individual Tk (k ¼ 1; . . . ;K) into a set T of values ac-
cepted by the group, whereas an operator eðÞ yields all the results of the method R compatible with T .
When aggregation occurs at the output level (Fig. 2), the operator eðÞ yields the set of results of the method
compatible with each DMs Tk, whereas an operator hðÞ aggregates the individual sets of results Rk into a
set of results R. The aggregation performed by f ðÞ and hðÞ does usually consist in averaging, minimizing a
distance measure, voting, etc.
2.3. A review of previous research in a similar setting
Before trying to explore the consequences of imprecision in the framework of the aggregation support
for group settings using VIP Analysis, we will now outline some previously proposed approaches. Taking
into account the context of VIP analysis, this review is limited to approaches based on additive value
functions and imprecise information for group decision making.
Kim and Ahn (1997) propose a two steps approach. The first step is based on the imprecise (or
incomplete) information provided by the decision makers and consists in the articulation of their prefer-
ences leading to individual results. This is based on the calculation of maximum/minimum expected values,
strict/weak dominance values, or ordinal ranking. In a second step a procedure to aggregate the preferences
of all group members is proposed, where the aggregation function is a difference of weighted sums of each
pair of actions, i.e., the group consensus is pursued from the analysis of pairwise dominance relations
between pairs of alternatives.
Kim and Ahn (1999) propose another approach starting again by the calculation of individual results,
i.e. strict or weak dominance relations are calculated by solving a series of LP problems. Here the utilityDMKDM2DM1 ...
T1 T2 TK...
T  f(T1, T2, ..., TK)
R  e(T)
R
←
←
Fig. 1. Individual perspectives aggregated at the methods input level.
DMKDM2DM1 ...
T1 T2 TK
...
R  h(R1, R2, ..., RK)
R1  e(T1) R2  e(T2) R2  e(T2)
R
← ← ←
←
Fig. 2. Individual perspectives aggregated at the methods output level.
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nance relations and it is built taking explicitly into account the individual preference strength. In fact, it is
based on the net preference intensity of each alternative defined as the difference between the degree a
alternative is preferred to all the others and that of the others being preferred to it.
Kim and Han (1999) propose a different approach. They assume imprecise information in the individual
utilities and in the weights associated to each additive value function as well as in the weights related to a
group utility function. Also here in a first step preferences are aggregated through weak/strict dominance
relations based on the calculation of max/min expected values. It is suggested the use of a probabilistic
measure, which is an indicator for the preference strength between alternatives. A second step, dedicated to
the enrichment of the group consensus, is also based on dominance relations. The elicitation of comple-
mentary information from the decision makers required by the second step is made interactively and
facilitated by the probabilistic measure above referred to. A mathematical programming model is proposed
to obtain the dominance relations.
Kim et al. (1999) propose still another approach to situations where the available information is
imprecise. Here, a range-type representation for utilities is used. In a first step, the utility range for each
member of the group is obtained by maximizing and minimizing, subject to constraints, the individual
utility functions. In a second step, the aggregation of the individual ranges yields the so-called total range
and agreed range of the groups preferences. The first corresponds to the intersection and the second to the
union of the group members ranges. Then, the decision makers try interactively to reduce the gap between
total range and agreed range. Finally, a weak domination relation based on pairwise comparison is built. If
any of the decision makers is not yet satisfied, the process is repeated taking into account the information
elicited previously.
Bana e Costa (1986) considers, in the framework of additive value functions, the actors express different,
and usually conflicting, levels of acceptance for the weights and proposes a methodology to enable the
decision maker to take into account these differences in the evaluation of the relative importance of the
criteria. Quoting the author: ‘‘The methodology proposes an Overall Compromise Criterion which ‘‘cor-
rects’’ the average sum aggregation of the performances by an Acceptability Index combining all actors
individual preferences’’. The group Acceptability Index is calculated using a joint density function. The
process enables to identify the least conflicting alternative.
Bana e Costa (1990) considers imprecise information regarding the different actors criterion preference
information. He proposes a two steps approach. First, the preferences representation is based on the
definition of outranking relations. Secondly, the incomparability between pairs of alternatives is progres-
sively reduced, in a compensatory framework. Thus, the use of the concept of Acceptability Index (Bana e
Costa, 1986), is combined with a new outranking approach designated by the author as Outweight
Analysis.
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proach is adequate to group decision settings, and considers that inaccurate or uncertain inputs can be
represented as probability distributions. Key issues of this method are: exploring the weight space, an
extension of the concept of acceptability index for each alternative (Bana e Costa, 1986), measuring the
variety of the valuations supporting it, together with the definition of a central weight vector for each
alternative, as the centre of gravity of weight space sub-region associated to it. The idea is to identify good
compromise alternatives in the framework of jointly accepted (by the DMs) additive utility functions shape.
Furthermore, a Confidence Factor is used in order to conclude about the level of accuracy of the input data
for supporting a decision. In Hokkanen et al. (1998) and in Lahdelma and Salminen (2001) extensions of
the SMAA are proposed.
In most of the approaches presented here, the explicit calculation of the individual results precedes the
search of group aggregated results (and this can be obtained by the application of an operator, previously
designated by hðÞ). Some of these approaches result in a ranking of the alternatives, whereas others are not
so normative.2.4. Methodology behind VIP-G
Keeping VIP Analysis attitude of exploring the consequences of imprecision, it seems appropriate to
consider f ðÞ or hðÞ (Figs. 1 and 2) as the set operations \ (intersection) or [ (union), as proposed by Dias
and Clımaco (2000b) for the context of Electre TRI. These are adequate operators as they do not perform
any kind of voting calculus: They just state what everybody agrees to include and what everybody agrees to
exclude, i.e., what inputs (or outputs) generate consensus. Other operators involve some kind of voting
using cardinal or ordinal preference information.
When using intersections in f ðÞ (hðÞ), set T (set R, respectively) will gather the input values (results,
respectively) that are acceptable by all the DMs, whereas if the union operation is used in f ðÞ (hðÞ), the
DMs will know the input values (results) that are not considered by any of them. In the first case, there is
consensus on what to include; in the second case, there is consensus on what to exclude.
Extending these possibilities, we also consider an ‘‘a -majority’’ aggregation operator, where a combi-
nation of parameter values or a result are considered acceptable if accepted by at least aK DMs (formally,
this can be seen as a continuous-space extension of Aizerman and Aleskerovs (1983) ‘‘k-majority’’ oper-
ators for social choice functions). This is equivalent to voting, for every conceivable input (or result) if the
group accepts it or not. The parameter a may vary between 1=K (corresponding to the operator [) and 1
(corresponding to the operator \), possibly in increments of 1=K. Indeed, if there are four DMs, the re-
quired ‘‘majorities’’ can be 1/4, 2/4, 3/4 and 4/4: Any value in the interval [1=4; 2=4[ yields the same as a
value of 1/4, etc.
If the aggregation is performed at the input level (Fig. 1), a possible ‘‘a -majority’’ aggregation operator
could beTðaÞ ¼ faðT1; . . . ; TKÞ ¼ t 2
[K
k¼1
Tk :
#fk 2 f1; . . . ;Kg : t 2 Tkg
K
(
P a
)
ða 2 ½1=K; 1Þ:This means that a combination t (a vector) of parameter values is considered acceptable (i.e. as belonging
to TðaÞ) if at least a  K DMs include it in their acceptable sets. As a particular case, when a ¼ 1, then t 2 Ta if
all DMs include t in their sets. When a ¼ 1=K, then for t 2 TðaÞ to hold it is enough that one DM includes t
in his/her set. Hencef1ðT1; . . . ; TKÞ ¼
\K
k¼1
Tk and f1=KðT1; . . . ; TKÞ ¼
[K
k¼1
Tk:
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provide some feedback to the individual DMs, who may confront their private model with models
acceptable by the group (by all members if a ¼ 1, by at least one member if a ¼ 1=K). However, since the
union of polyhedral sets is not usually a polyhedron, TðaÞ (a > 1=K) would not be a valid input for VIP
Analysis. Hence, a more appropriate choice would be to take the convex hull of TðaÞ instead. Unfortu-
nately, the computations to compute the convex hull may be complex and time consuming (Avis et al.,
1997). It may happen that TðaÞ becomes void, particularly as a approaches 1, although this should not
happen frequently if there is no strong conflict among the DMs. In such cases, the individual polytopes
might be changed either by discussing the constraints or by automatically dropping or loosening con-
straints in a fair manner.
Performing the aggregation at the output level (Fig. 2) is simpler and, since there is a many-to-one
correspondence between parameter values and results (e.g., there are many combinations of parameter
values yielding the same alternative as the best one), it is more likely to facilitate consensus. A possible ‘‘a-
majority’’ aggregation operator could beRðaÞ ¼ haðR1; . . . ;RKÞ ¼ r 2
[K
k¼1
Rk :
#fk 2 f1; . . . ;Kg : r 2 Rkg
K
(
P a
)
ða 2 ½1=K; 1Þ:This means that a result r (a number) is considered acceptable (i.e. as belonging to RðaÞ) if at least a  K DMs
include it in their result sets. As particular cases, we have a ¼ 1 (all DMs include it) and a ¼ 1=K (at least
one DM includes it):h1ðR1; . . . ;RKÞ ¼
\K
k¼1
Rk and h1=KðR1; . . . ;RKÞ ¼
[K
k¼1
Rk:It may happen that RðaÞ becomes void, which implies that TðaÞ is also void. However, there may exist sit-
uations where TðaÞ is void but not RðaÞ. The purpose of computing the set RðaÞ is not to impose a ‘‘consensus’’
set of results, but to provide some feedback to the individual DMs, who may confront their private results
with the ones accepted by the group (all the members if a ¼ 1, at least one member if a ¼ 1=K, or some
required support in between this extremes).
The conclusions that are drawn from RðaÞ need some careful interpretation. For instance, consider a
group composed of three DMs evaluating an alternative ai. The first DM accepts a convex set of
possible input values (T1), which (let us suppose) yield minfV ðai; kÞ : k 2 T g ¼ 0:4 and maxfV ðai; kÞ :
k 2 Tg ¼ 0:65. From the convexity of T1 and the linearity of V ðÞ, the interval of possible results
corresponding to T1 is V ðaiÞ 2 ½0:4; 0:65. Let us further suppose that the set T2 of possible input values
accepted by the second DM yielded the interval V ðaiÞ 2 ½0:5; 0:7, whereas the third DM reached the
interval V ðaiÞ 2 ½0:6; 0:75 (see Fig. 3). In this case, Rð1Þ would yield that V ðaiÞ 2 ½0:6; 0:65 (i.e. values
acceptable by all DMs), Rð2=3Þ would yield that V ðaiÞ 2 ½0:5; 0:7 (i.e. values acceptable by at least 2 out
of 3 DMs), and Rð1=3Þ would yield that V ðaiÞ 2 ½0:4; 0:75 (i.e. values acceptable by at least one DM).
Now, it is not reasonable to say that the group unanimously considers that V ðaiÞ is not less than 0.6,
just because the intersection Rð1Þ yields that V ðaiÞ 2 ½0:6; 0:65. Indeed, only the third DM supports that
conclusion. What we could say (from Rð1=3Þ) is that the group unanimously agrees that V ðaiÞ cannot be
less than 0.4.
This approach to aggregating the outputs may hence be seen from another perspective while keeping the
same idea. Let us consider Ck (k ¼ 1; . . . ;K) as sets of individual conclusions (propositions) of the following
types: V ðaiÞP x; V ðaiÞ6 x; RegretðaiÞ6 x; and V ðaiÞ  V ðajÞ6 x.
The ‘‘a-majority’’ aggregation operator (a 2 ½1=K; 1) yields a set of conclusions acceptable by the group
as follows:
DM3
DM2
DM1
.40 .50 .60 .70.65 .75
Fig. 3. Range of value for ai according to three members of a group.
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[K
k¼1
Ck :
#fk 2 f1; . . . ;Kg : c 2 Ck _ ðc0 ) c ^ c0 2 CkÞg
K
(
P a
)
:This means that a conclusion c (a proposition) is considered acceptable (i.e. as belonging to CðaÞ) if at least
a  K DMs reach the same conclusion (or a conclusion that implies it; e.g., the conclusion V ðaiÞP 0:8
implies the conclusion V ðaiÞP 0:7). As particular cases, we have a ¼ 1 (all DMs reach a conclusion) and
a ¼ 1=K (at least one DM reaches it).
There is a direct correspondence (a sort of duality) between sets CðaÞ and Rð1aþ1=KÞ: the consequences in
the first are drawn from the results in the latter, and vice versa. In particular, if we know from Rð1=KÞ that for
a given variable vðÞ all values in an interval ½x; y are acceptable by at least one DM, then we will know that
the conclusions ‘‘vðÞ cannot be lower than x ’’ and ‘‘vðÞ cannot be higher than y’’ are robust conclusions
accepted by all the group (i.e. belong to Cð1Þ).
It may also be of interest for a member to determine the aggregated results of a sub-group G. Namely, G
may correspond to the group formed by all members except him/her, or to a group of members that he/she
perceives as interesting to isolate, e.g., because they are from the same department. The aggregation
operator could be the following (with a 2 ½1=#G; 1 1=#G):CGa ¼ qGa ðC1; . . . ;CKÞ ¼ c 2
[K
k¼1
Ck :
#fk 2 G : c 2 Ck _ ðc0 ) c ^ c0 2 CkÞg
#G
(
P a
)
:Similar definitions may be proposed concerning the inputs (TGa ) and results (R
G
a ).
In the identification of quasi-dominated and quasi-optimal alternatives in standalone VIP Analysis, the
DMs may consider a tolerance parameter e, as explained in Section 2.1. When upgrading to Group VIP
Analysis, the DMs tolerance e may vary conjointly with the majority level a. Indeed, the DMs may inquire
what alternatives are quasi-dominated according to an a-majority, noting that obtaining a quasi-dominance
with a high value for a may require a high value for e (see an illustrative example in Section 3).
Each DM may analyze the consequences of imprecision (robust conclusions, variability of results) using
his/her model and compare these consequences with Ca (or CGa , for some G). This will provide each DM
with an idea of where and by how much is he/she far from the groups mainstream. An important aspect
here is that each group member may vary the parameters a (and e) independently of the other members
when performing private comparisons between his/her conclusions and Ca (or CGa ). As an analogy, we may
imagine a group of persons listening to the same music using headphones, but each one setting the volume
lower or higher at his/her discretion.3. Illustrative example
As an illustrative example for the methodology proposed in this paper, let us consider a classical problem
analysed by Keeney and Nair in the 70s. We follow this study as reported by Roy and Bouyssou (1993),
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of a location for a nuclear plant, faced by the Washington Public Power Supply System. Table 1 indicates
the value of seven potential sites (to simplify the presentation we consider here only a subset of the
alternatives) according to six value functions representing the criteria ‘‘impact on human health’’, ‘‘loss of
salmon’’, ‘‘impact on other species’’, ‘‘impact on economy’’, ‘‘aesthetics’’ and ‘‘cost’’. Let us now imagine
that there are four Decision Makers responsible for the decision, who agree on the single-criteria values in
Table 1, but have different opinions concerning the importance of each criterion.
Using an additive value function model, criteria importance is introduced in the form of scaling con-
stants k1; . . . ; k6, which define trade-off ratios among the value functions. For instance, if k1 ¼ 3k2, this
means that one unit of value in function v2ðÞ is worth three units of value in function v1ðÞ. Such values are
often elicited by asking questions like ‘‘how much would you be willing to lose in criterion cost to gain 0.1
units in criterion impact on human life?’’. Such questions are sometimes very hard to answer in a precise
way. Hence, the possibility of answering in terms of acceptable values rather than a precise value may be
particularly welcome.
In our hypothetical example, let us suppose that DMs start by placing few constraints on the values they
consider acceptable, although some of them are less restrictive than others:
DM1: k6P k5 (i.e., an increase of an amount x in v6ðÞ is more attractive than a similar increase in v5ðÞ)
DM2: k6P k1P k2P k3
DM3: k6P kj, j ¼ 1; . . . ; 5
DM4: k6P k2P k4P k3:
Furthermore, without loss of generality we consider also the ‘‘normalization’’ constraints
k1 þ    þ k6 ¼ 1 and kjP 0 (j ¼ 1; . . . ; 6). Let us define the setTable
Value
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6
a7T ¼ fðk1; . . . ; k6Þ : k1 þ    þ k6 ¼ 1 and kjP 0 ðj ¼ 1; . . . ; 6Þg:
The combinations of values for the scaling constants each one considers acceptable (at this stage) areT1 ¼ fðk1; . . . ; k6Þ 2 T : k6P k5g T2 ¼ fðk1; . . . ; k6Þ 2 T : k6P k1P k2P k3g;
T3 ¼ fðk1; . . . ; k6Þ 2 T : k6P kj; j ¼ 1; . . . ; 5g T4 ¼ fðk1; . . . ; k6Þ 2 T : k6P k2P k4P k3g:
Given these four sets, VIP-G can compute the minimum and maximum global value V ðaiÞ attainable by
each alternative, which are depicted in Table 2 (each of these values is obtained by solving a linear pro-
gram). It is visible that the result concerning a1, for instance, varies among the DMs:
DM1s range: V ða1Þ½1 2 ½0:715; 0:99
DM2s range: V ða1Þ½2 2 ½0:732; 0:981
of seven alternatives according to each one of six criteria
v1ðaiÞ v2ðaiÞ v3ðaiÞ v4ðaiÞ v5ðaiÞ v6ðaiÞ
0.715 0.989533 0.8135 0.7316 0.98 0.957466
0.8 0.989533 0.8135 0.7145 0.98 1
0.875 0.989533 0.802 0.7149 0.86 0.96799
0.76 0.99782 0.63 0.5925 0.88 0.959617
0.78 0.993586 0.469 0.68535 0.76 0.728686
0.885 0.998013 0.469 0.56375 0.98 0.60035
0.74 0.99879 0.7345 0.5725 1 0.89758
Table 2
Minimum and maximum global value of the alternatives according to the different DMs
DM1 DM2 DM3 DM4
min V ðaiÞ max V ðaiÞ min V ðaiÞ max V ðaiÞ min V ðaiÞ max V ðaiÞ min V ðaiÞ max V ðaiÞ
a1 0.715 0.99 0.732 0.98 0.801 0.976 0.715 0.98
a2 0.714 1 0.714 1 0.832 1 0.8 1
a3 0.715 0.99 0.715 0.968 0.828 0.979 0.86 0.979
a4 0.593 0.998 0.593 0.96 0.727 0.979 0.76 0.979
a5 0.469 0.994 0.685 0.834 0.599 0.861 0.719 0.861
a6 0.469 0.998 0.564 0.98 0.535 0.866 0.6 0.98
a7 0.572 0.999 0.572 1 0.735 0.965 0.74 1
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DM4s range: V ða1Þ½4 2 ½0:715; 0:98
The duality between results and conclusions can be observed:
• V ða1Þð1=4Þ 2 ½0:715; 0:99: values in this range are supported by at least 1/4 of the DMs, but 4/4 of them
agree that the minimum value is 0.715;
• V ða1Þð2=4Þ 2 ½0:715; 0:98: values in this range are supported by at least 2/4 of the DMs, but at least 3/4 of
them agree that the minimum value is 0.715;
• V ða1Þð3=4Þ 2 ½0:732; 0:98: values in this range are supported by at least 3/4 of the DMs, and at least 2/4 of
them agree that the minimum value is 0.732;
• V ða1Þð4=4Þ 2 ½0:801; 0:976: values in this range are supported by 4/4 of the DMs, but only 1/4 of them
agree that the minimum value is 0.801.
VIP-G also uses linear programming to compute the maximum advantage of each alternative ai against
any other alternative aj, i.e., maxfV ðai; kÞ  V ðaj; kÞ : k 2 Tkg (k ¼ 1; . . . ; 4). The result obtained by each
DM is presented in Table 3(a)–(d). For instance, according to DM1, the maximum difference of value of a1
over a2 is 0.017. As another example, DM2 finds that the maximum difference of value of a5 over a1 is
)0.046. This means that V ða1Þ is always higher than V ða5Þ given the constraints defining T2. Alternative a5 is
hence dominated according to DM2 (and DM3 and DM4).
Some alternatives are not dominated, but quasi-dominated if the DMs allow for a small tolerance e. For
instance, comparing a1 and a7 DMs conclude:
DM1: maxfV ða7; kÞ  V ða1; kÞ : k 2 T1g ¼ 0:025; hence, a1D0:025a7 (a1 quasi-dominates a7 with a tolerance
of 0.025, according to DM1);
DM2: maxfV ða7; kÞ  V ða1; kÞ : k 2 T2g ¼ 0:02; hence, a1D0:02a7;
DM3: maxfV ða7; kÞ  V ða1; kÞ : k 2 T3g < 0; hence a1Da7; (a1 dominates a7, according to DM3);
DM4: maxfV ða7; kÞ  V ða1; kÞ : k 2 T4g ¼ 0:025; hence, a1D0:025a7.
This example shows the existing interplay between the tolerance e and the majority level a. If we denote
by aiDeðaÞaj the assertion ‘‘ai quasi-dominates aj with tolerance e for a majority of a’’, it is obvious that one
may need a higher tolerance to obtain a wider majority supporting the conclusion, as illustrated in Fig. 4:
all four DMs agree that a1D0:025ð4=4Þa7; two out of four DMs agree that a1D0:02ð2=4Þa7; and one out of four
DMs finds that a1 dominates a7 (Fig. 4).
Let us imagine that all DMs agreed that a difference of 0.025 is negligible, i.e., they all accept a tolerance
e ¼ 0:025. Then there would be a consensus that alternative a7 was quasi-dominated and could be dropped
Table 3
Pairwise comparison of maximum difference of value according to (a) DM1, (b) DM2, (c) DM3, (d) DM4
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
(a)
a1 0.017 0.055 0.184 0.344 0.357 0.159
a2 0.085 0.076 0.184 0.344 0.4 0.142
a3 0.16 0.075 0.172 0.333 0.368 0.142
a4 0.045 0.008 0.008 0.231 0.359 0.062
a5 0.065 0.004 0.004 0.093 0.128 0.113
a6 0.17 0.085 0.01 0.125 0.105 0.145
a7 0.025 0.009 0.035 0.104 0.266 0.297
Max regret 0.17 0.085 0.76 0.184 0.344 0.368 0.145
(b)
a1 0.017 0.12 0.139 0.229 0.357 0.159
a2 0.064 0.12 0.122 0.271 0.4 0.142
a3 0.085 0.021 0.122 0.239 0.368 0.142
a4 0.024 )0.024 0.02 0.231 0.359 0.062
a5 )0.046 )0.029 )0.03 0.093 0.128 0.113
a6 0 0 0.12 0.1 0.22 )0.009
a7 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.12 0.24 0.297
Max regret 0.085 0.021 0.14 0.139 0.271 0.4 0.159
(c)
a1 )0.005 0.055 0.107 0.287 0.357 0.109
a2 0.064 0.076 0.115 0.308 0.4 0.122
a3 0.085 0.021 0.104 0.286 0.368 0.116
a4 0.024 )0.016 0.007 0.231 0.359 0.062
a5 )0.051 )0.079 )0.088 )0.031 0.128 )0.005
a6 )0.045 )0.077 )0.057 )0.033 0.066 )0.036
a7 )0.001 )0.024 0.035 0.054 0.225 0.297
Max regret 0.085 0.021 0.076 0.115 0.308 0.4 0.122
(d)
a1 0 0.12 0.1 0.229 0.357 0.072
a2 0.085 0.12 0.1 0.271 0.4 0.102
a3 0.16 0.075 0.115 0.239 0.368 0.135
a4 0.045 )0.016 0.02 0.231 0.359 0.062
a5 0.065 )0.02 )0.088 0.02 0.128 0.04
a6 0.17 0.085 0.12 0.125 0.22 0.145
a7 0.025 0.02 0.14 0.12 0.24 0.297
Max regret 0.17 0.085 0.14 0.125 0.271 0.4 0.145
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e ¼ 0:025. Only DM1 prevents a6 from being considered quasi-dominated. This alternative could be
dropped if either the group accepted a 3/4 majority (a ¼ 0:75) or if DM1 accepted a tolerance of 0.085. As a
matter of fact, if all DMs accepted a tolerance e ¼ 0:085, then a2 would quasi-dominate all other alter-
natives: it is quasi-optimal for that tolerance for all the DMs.
The methodology of VIP-G can hence be used to simplify the problem, as illustrated here, by a pro-
gressive elimination of the less interesting alternatives. Despite the lack of precision and imperfect con-
1/4 2/4 3/4 1
0
0.020
0.025
a1 ∆ε(α) a7
~(a1 ∆ε(α) a7)
ε
α
Fig. 4. Relation between tolerance and majority for the pair (a7; a1).
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help each DM individually to provide more precise inputs at the same time he/she learns the results yielded
by the other DMs inputs. The group may readily appreciate where they are in agreement and where they
most disagree, using this information to guide the process. However, VIP-G does not deal with the pos-
sibility of group members trying to manipulate results or sabotage consensus.4. A GDSS architecture for VIP-G
Fig. 5 outlines the planned architecture for VIP-G. At its current development stage, VIP-G is able to
process and aggregate the DMs inputs, although it lacks the message passing and management capabilities
that will allow its users to communicate effortlessly. It is planned to be a system based on a server to which
several DMs may connect using the Internet. Indeed, this presents the advantage of allowing DMs to log in
from virtually any place with access to the Internet.
Each DM uses a client application similar to the standalone VIP Analysis to perform private analyses,
using the server to disclose and to gather information regarding the inputs he/she is considering and the
results he/she is getting. The servers role is to manage the database of the DMs inputs, broadcasting to all
the DMs (i.e. to the client applications) the inputs collected from all of them (this waiting condition may be
replaced by a calendar deadline). If anonymity is required, then the server may aggregate inputs and results,Analysis of group's
results
Structured and
unstructured
communications
Analysis of DM's
own inputs
DM's environment to perform private analyses
To/from server
Inputs
aggregation
Outputs
aggregation
Fig. 5. VIP-G architecture: Client application.
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aggregation’’ and ‘‘Outputs aggregation’’ might be located in the server, rather than the client. However,
DMs would no longer be able to analyze the results of sub-groups of interest chosen by them (as proposed
in Section 2.4).
The module (‘‘Analysis of DMs own inputs’’ module) corresponds to the use of VIP Analysis as if its
user was the sole DM. The entire interaction occurs as when using the standalone version of VIP Analysis.
Individual analyses may be confronted with the DMs view of any group Gs current standings (‘‘Analysis
of groups results’’ module), namely the results RGa . This view is also personal, in that the DM may select the
composition of G (whole group, whole group except him/her, etc.), and may privately set the parameters for
the majority level (a) and the tolerance (e).
The results RGa are either simply aggregated by the module ‘‘Outputs aggregation’’, after collecting the
outputs Rkðk 2 GÞ currently disclosed by Gs members, or computed after the module ‘‘Inputs aggregation’’
collects and aggregates the inputs Tk (k 2 G) currently disclosed by Gs members. The conclusions CGa stem
directly from the results, as explained in Section 2.4.
Fig. 6 presents an example of the envisaged confrontation of an individual DMs perspective with the
groups aggregated perspective (the data are the same used in Section 3). The chart on the left corresponds
to the private analysis of the DM using the client application. The chart on the right corresponds to the
aggregated outputs of a group of interest defined by that DM, consisting of him/her plus three other DMs
(i.e. K ¼ 4). This chart shows three ranges for each alternative: the outer one corresponds to Rð1=4ÞðCð1ÞÞ; the
middle one (gray) corresponds to RðaÞðCð1aþ1=4ÞÞ, i.e. Rð3=4ÞðCð1=2ÞÞ; and the inner one (black) corresponds to
Rð1ÞðCð1=4ÞÞ. Considering a2, for instance, the values in the range ½0:715; 0; 99 are obtainable by at least one
from the four DMs (thus, all four agree that V ða2ÞP 0:715). The values in the range [0.732, 0.98] are
obtained by at least three DMs (thus, 50% of the group agree that V ða2ÞP 0:732Þ. Finally, the values in the
range [0.801, 0,976] are obtainable by all four DMs, but that means that only one of them would agree with
the conclusion that V ða2ÞP 0:801. All this information is concisely presented. If the DM changes the re-
quired majority level (using the ‘‘trackbar’’) then the middle ranges (gray) will also change. They will
coincide with the outer ranges (white) if the majority is set at the minimum R:25%/C:100%; they will
coincide with the inner ranges (black) if the majority is set at the maximum R:100%/C:25%.
Fig. 7 illustrates the presentation of the aggregation of pair-wise confrontation tables from a group of
four DMs (the data are the same used in Section 3). Each cell presents three numbers: the one at the left top
corresponds to corresponds to Rð1ÞCð1=4Þ; the one at the right top corresponds to Rð1=4ÞðCð1ÞÞ; the one at the
middle bottom corresponds to Rð1=2ÞðCð3=4ÞÞ. For instance, the numbers corresponding to ða1; a2Þ inform
that: a2Dð1=4Þa1, a2D0;017ð3=4Þa1, and a2D0;017ð4=4Þa1, i.e., if the DMs accept a tolerance of 0.017, then it is
unanimous that a1 is dominated by a2.
The module ‘‘Structured and unstructured communications’’ (Fig. 5) is responsible for all the com-
munications between the users working environment and the server. It receives structured messages aboutFig. 6. Private vs. group ranges.
Fig. 7. Aggregation of opinions concerning dominance among alternatives.
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‘‘Outputs aggregation’’ and ‘‘Inputs aggregation’’ modules, respectively. Moreover, it may send each users
sets Rk and/or Tk, when they wish to do so, to the other DMs. Depending on the characteristics of the group
and the decision problem, a user-driven approach may suffice, or a facilitator may be needed to establish
deadlines and to encourage participation. This module will also allow unstructured communications (as in
e-mail) to enable informal discussions both about the decision problem (e.g., to defend an opinion, or to
propose the exclusion of an alternative) and the decision-making process (e.g., to establish a deadline, or to
prompt others to discuss an open issue).5. Summary and future research
We started by reviewing VIP Analysis, as proposed by Dias and Clımaco. It is a methodology/software
suitable to support a group of DMs meeting face-to-face around a computer, sharing an imprecisely defined
model, therefore agreeing on the robust conclusions. The outputs of VIP Analysis may allow the decision
process to progress, as the DMs learn about the model and the problem, postponing the elicitation
questions they find difficult to answer, or prone to generate conflict. The software can be used to direct the
elicitation of further information with the purpose of progressively reducing the imprecision, using these
outputs to structure the dialogue among the DMs.
We have then proposed an extension that we named VIP-G, offering explicit aggregation tools, and
allowing DMs to work privately and spatially distributed, while keeping the advantages mentioned in the
previous paragraph. Each DM can perform private analyses, which may be confronted with his/her view of
any group Gs current standings, privately setting the parameters for the majority level (a) and the tolerance
(e). VIP-G maintains the ‘‘exploration’’ philosophy of VIP Analysis, not demanding precise information,
and providing robust conclusions with wide support from the group (possibly with a tolerance). Not only
may this prevent unnecessary conflict (there is a many-to-one correspondence between parameter values
and conclusions), but it may guide the group decision-making process. Moreover, the feedback each
member receives as what can accepted by the other members can facilitate issuing proposals (e.g. ‘‘can we
drop a7 from consideration?’’, ‘‘can we agree that k1P k2?’’) and can encourage the convergence of opinions
(unfortunately, it can also facilitate manipulation, but we are assuming that all group members are gen-
uinely trying to reach consensus).
The focus of this paper has been directed to the aggregation of results, which seemed the most promising
than the aggregation of inputs (parameter values), emphasizing the duality between shared results and
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that the aggregation of inputs deserves further research, namely on overcoming the difficulties in using non-
convex sets resulting from the aggregation, and helping the DMs in the cases where the aggregated set of
acceptable inputs is empty. Anticipating such cases, VIP-G could be complemented with tools to deal with
inconsistent systems of constraints (Chinneck, 1997) to propose alternatives to restore the consistency that
could be accepted by the group.
The details concerning the communications module of the proposed GDSS are still a subject for future
research, both at the client level and server level. The Internet offers excellent potential to support com-
munications, and an interesting development for the future would be to implement VIP-G clients based on
a Web interface, to take advantage of the users familiarity with browsers.
Furthermore, other decision support tools could be offered to use the knowledge about the inputs and
outputs of all the DMs to compute some measures of the proximity among its members (e.g. comparing
rankings, or computing distances among the centroids of T1; . . . ; TK) and their degree of indecisiveness (e.g.
comparing the volumes of T1; . . . ; TK). Some of these tools might be available only to a facilitator, if there is
one. Here also, there is a vast field for research.
Finally, at a more general level, there are two interesting items for future research: to study how to avoid
manipulation of results (if possible), and to study whether (or how) a system like the proposed Group VIP
Analysis may be used for negotiation support.Acknowledgement
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